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Mary Roe (hereinafter "Roe") began counseling sessions with
the respondent priest, Father Piche, in February 1982.1 In June
1982, Roe moved into the convent house adjacent to Father Piche's
church.2 On July 31, 1982, shortly after turning eighteen, Roe's re-
lationship with Father Piche became sexual in nature.3 Subse-
quently, Roe moved out of the convent house, but the sexual
relationship continued.4 Roe moved back into the convent house in
May 1984.5 Soon thereafter, Roe observed that Father Piche was
spending considerable time with another woman, whom Piche even-
tually married. 6 The counseling relationship between Piche and
Roe ended in August 1984, and the sexual relationship ended late
in 1984. 7
* B.A., summa cum laude, University of Minnesota; J.D. expected 1996, Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School. The author wishes to express her gratitude to
Cheryl Dalby, DeAnne Dulas, and Phillip Horn for providing invaluable editorial ad-
vice, as well as Maureen Cavanaugh for her guidance and leadership. The author is
also indebted to Sarah Garb, for her constant encouragement and friendship, the two
Dan Conroys, for their support, and Kathy Caughey, for instilling confidence and a
love of learning. Most of all, this author wishes to thank Travis Milloy, for his infi-
nite understanding and love.
1. Mary Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 518 N.W.2d 629 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1994), rev. denied (Aug. 24, 1994).
2. Roe was seventeen years old at the time she moved into the Church of St.
Timothy convent house. Id. at 630. Roe lived at the convent house until August
1982, and again from May 1984 to February 1985. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Roe, 518 N.W.2d at 630.
6. Id.
7. Roe stated that she felt "used and abused" by Piche at this point, and that
during this period she lost interest in Piche and just knew that the relationship was
wrong. Id. It was also during this time that Roe began losing faith in the Church.
Id. at 630-31.
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In February 1985, Roe attempted suicide with a razor blade.8
A few months later Roe moved to Arizona. 9 While in Arizona, she
met and married John Roe.1O Prior to the marriage, Mary Roe did
not disclose her relationship with Father Piche to John Roe." Roe
did not think or talk about her relationship with Piche during the
three years she lived in Arizona.12
Roe and her husband moved back to Minnesota in August
1988.13 In October 1988, memories of the relationship with Father
Piche began to resurface.14 As the memories returned, Roe began
to suffer psychological problems, including suicidal ideation and
self-mutilation.15 In July 1992, Roe watched a news program ad-
dressing sexual abuse by members of the clergy. 16 After seeing the
program, Roe sought psychological counseling from psychologist El-
len Luepker.17 According to Luepker, while in Arizona, Roe had
suppressed all memory of her relationship with Piche, and only
upon viewing the television program was Roe able to link her psy-
chological injuries to her relationship with Piche.'S Subsequently,
Roe filed a complaint against Piche on July 31, 1992.19
The Roe court applied the statutory delayed discovery rule,20
which states that "an action for damages based on personal injury
8. Id. At this time, Roe was also involved in a relationship with R.M., who
immediately broke off the relationship when Roe disclosed her relationship with Fa-
ther Piche. Roe stated that R.M. had "every reason to abandon her" because she
believed that her relationship with Piche had been wrong. Id. at 631.










18. Roe, 518 N.W.2d at 631.
19. Id. In the complaint, Roe alleged assault, breach of fiduciary duty, and negli-
gent counseling. Roe also included the Archdiocese as a defendant, alleging it was
liable by means of the doctrine respondeat superior and negligent placement or su-
pervision. Id. In addition, John Roe alleged loss of consortium as against all of the
respondents. Id.
20. MIN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 subd. 2(a) (West 1992). The pertinent part of
Minnesota's delayed discovery statute reads:
Actions for damages due to sexual abuse; special provisions
Subd. 2. Limitations period.
(a) An action for damages based on personal injury caused by
sexual abuse must be commenced within six years of the time the
plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused
by the sexual abuse.
(b) The plaintiff need not establish which act in a continuous se-
ries of sexual abuse acts by the defendant caused the injury. (c)
254 [Vol. 13:253
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caused by sexual abuse must be commenced within six years of the
time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was
caused by the sexual abuse."21 The court found that there existed
no issue of material fact as to whether Roe had reason to know,
prior to 1985, that she had been sexually abused because the evi-
dence overwhelmingly indicated that a reasonable person in Roe's
position should have had such knowledge.22 In addition, the court
held that the delayed discovery rule does not provide that the limi-
tations period be tolled if an adult victim-survivor represses memo-
ries of the abuse after she has linked her injuries to the abuse.23
The court concluded that under the delayed discovery statute, Roe's
claims were barred by the statute of limitations and, therefore, the
granting of summary judgment in favor of respondents was
proper.24
Part I of this article sets forth the injuries commonly suffered
by sexual abuse victim-survivors as well as the history and applica-
tion of delayed discovery rules. Part II discusses the Roe court's
holding and reasoning. Part III analyzes the rule set forth by the
Roe court. Under the Roe court's analysis, the Minnesota delayed
discovery rule precludes the tolling of the statute of limitations dur-
ing the time period that memories of the abuse are repressed by a
victim-survivor, if prior to the repression the victim-survivor had
reason to know that her injuries were caused by sexual abuse. This
Comment then contends by so holding that the Roe court has cre-
ated a troubling interpretation of the delayed discovery statute
which could potentially deny a class of plaintiffs access to a civil
remedy for personal injuries caused by childhood sexual abuse.
More importantly, this Comment asserts that the Roe court misin-
terpreted the standard set forth in the Minnesota delayed discovery
statute. The court examined whether the plaintiff was aware of the
abuse and the wrongfulness of the abuse, rather than examining
whether Roe knew or should have known that her injuries were a
result of the abuse. In addition, this Comment asserts that the rea-
sonable person standard adopted by the Roe court fails to consider
The knowledge of a parent or guardian may not be imputed to a
minor ....
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West 1992).
The trial court applied the delayed discovery rule without addressing the re-
spondent's argument that the relationship between Roe and Piche did not constitute
sexual abuse as defined by Minnesota Statutes. MiN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.342-.345
(West 1992). The appellate court thus assumed, without deciding, that Piche's rela-
tionship with Roe constituted sexual abuse. Roe, 518 N.W.2d at 631.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 632.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 633.
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the effects of sexual abuse on the victim-survivor's ability to caus-
ally connect her injuries to the abuse.
Delayed Discovery Rule and Sexual Abuse:
A Brief Historical Perspective
A Injuries Suffered by Victims of Sexual Abuse
The effects of sexual abuse25 are severe and varied. Victims of
sexual abuse are harmed by "invisible wounds" which damage the
victim-survivor's sense of self and his or her relationships with
others.26 The manifestation of injuries caused by sexual abuse may
begin during or immediately after the initial abuse.27 Injuries suf-
fered by victim-survivors during the period in which the abuse is
occurring include feelings of shame, anxiety, guilt, low self-esteem
and depression."28 In addition to the immediate injuries, many sur-
vivors of sexual abuse begin to develop symptoms much later, often
years after the abuse has ended.29 Symptoms which sometimes ap-
pear after the abuse has ended include sexual dysfunction,3O alco-
hol and drug abuse,31 depression and suicidal tendencies.32
Furthermore, due to the often continuing nature of the abuse, many
25. Sexual abuse is defined in MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.342-.345 (West 1992).
26. Rebecca L. Thomas, Note, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and
Statutes of Limitations: A Call for Legislative Action, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1245,
1251-52 (1991).
27. See, e.g., Ann Marie Hagen, Note, Tolling the Statute of Limitations for Adult
Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 76 IOWA L. REv. 355, 359 (1991); see also Julie
Schwartz Silberg, Comment, Memory Repression: Should it Toll the Statutory Limi-
tations Period in Child Sexual Abuse Cases?, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1589, 1593 (1993).
28. Hagen, supra note 27, at 359.
29. See, e.g., Silberg, supra note 27, at 1593; Lisa Bickel, Note, Tolling the Stat-
ute of Limitations in Actions Brought by Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse,
33 ARIz. L. REv. 427, 429 (1991). Generally, a survivor of childhood sexual abuse
seeks counseling for "chronic depression accompanied by guilt, poor self-esteem, and
feelings of powerlessness." Thomas, supra note 26, at 1255 n.85 (citing Denise J.
Gelinas, The Persisting Negative Effects of Incest, 46 PSYCmATRY 312, 319 (1983)).
30. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 29, at 429. According to a number of studies,
victim-survivors of childhood sexual abuse may, as adults, become sexually promis-
cuous. See Hagen, supra note 27, at 360. Conversely, other studies indicate that
victim-survivors may have difficulty in forming "meaningful relationships because of
lack of sexual response." Id. at 360-61.
31. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 29, at 429.
32. See, e.g., Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories
Lie? Words of Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory
Repression, 84 J. Cnms. L. & CRumNowGy 129 (1993). Additional long-term effects of
childhood sexual abuse may include an increased tendency towards prostitution or
promiscuity, an inability to form intimate relationships, an increased likelihood of
being predisposed to future victimization, and an increased likelihood of being
predisposed to engage in abusive behavior towards one's own children. See, e.g.,
Thomas, supra note 26, at 1252-54.
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survivors of childhood sexual abuse develop "psychological armor"
in order to survive the ordeal.33
Although the exact percentage is unknown, many victim-sur-
vivors repress all memories of the abuse.34 According to the theory
of repression, upon the occurrence of a shocking or traumatic event,
the mind may react by pushing the memory of the event to the un-
conscious, where it may stay for an indefinite period of time.3 5
Childhood sexual abuse is "especially conducive to repression of
memory of the incident."36 Repressed memories of the childhood
33. Thomas, supra note 26, at 1254.
34. Figures on the number of victim-survivors who repress memories of the sex-
ual abuse range from 18% to 59%. Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed
Memories, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 518, 522 (May 1993). Repression, while it provides
the victim with a short-term coping mechanism, can subsequently lead to serious
long-term difficulties. See, e.g., Ensdorff & Loftus, supra note 32. This delay in the
onset of symptoms is often attributed to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. See, e.g.,
Thomas, supra note 26, at 1252-54. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder occurs when the
"person has experienced an event that is outside the range of usual human experi-
ence and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone." DIAGNOSTIC AND
STAT. MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 250 (3d edg. rev. 1987).
B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in at least one of
the following ways:
(1) recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event...
(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event
(3) sudden acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring
(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to events that symbol-
ize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event, including anniver-
saries of the trauma.
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma or
numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as
indicated by at least three of the following:
(1) efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings associated with the trauma
(2) efforts to avoid activities or situations that arouse recollections
of the trauma
(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma...
(4) markedly diminished interest in significant activities...
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
(6) restricted range of affect...
(7) sense of a foreshortened future ....
Id.
35. See, e.g., Loftus, supra note 34, at 518. Repression has been classified as the
"queen of defenses." Elizabeth F. Loftus, et al., Memories of Childhood Sexual
Abuse: Remembering and Repressing, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 67, 68 (1994). "In a
very general way, [repression] refers to a warding off of any conscious experience of a
frightening memory, wish, or fantasy, or of unwanted emotions. When discussed in
the context of child sexual abuse, the extent of banishment from consciousness as-
sumed in some definitions of repression is virtually total." Id.
36. Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 32.
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sexual abuse are often revived by a triggering event 37 or through
therapy.38
Another coping mechanism employed by victim-survivors as a
method of surviving sexual abuse is denial.39 Denial is "accom-
plished by withholding conscious understanding of the meaning
and implications of what is perceived."40 Because sexual abuse vic-
tims are often repeatedly subjected to the abuse, complete denial of
the occurrence of sexual abuse is not very common. 41 Rather, vic-
tim-survivors tend to deny the importance of the abuse.42 Despite
conscious efforts by the victim-survivor to continue denying the im-
portance of the abuse, the effects of the abuse usually intrude into
the victim-survivor's everyday life.43 Denial may continue for years
after the abuse has ended, until a triggering event occurs.44
37. See, e.g., Silberg, supra note 27, at 1595-97. Triggering events can include,
for example, giving birth, encountering a certain scent, the death of the abuser, or
hearing or reading another victim of abuse recount her victimization. Id. See also
infra note 44.
38. See, e.g., Hagen, supra note 27, at 362-63. For examples of therapist-aided
revival of repressed memories of sexual abuse, see e.g., Loftus, supra note 34, at 518-
20. See also infra note 50.
39. See Thomas, supra note 26, at 1254-55.
40. Thomas, supra note 26, at 1254 n.74 (citing Horowitz, et al., A Classification
Theory of Defense, in REPRESSION & DISSOCIATION 80 (J. Singer ed. 1990)).
41. Denise J. Gelinas, The Persisting Negative Effects of Incest, 46 PSYCmIATRY
312 (1983) (emphasis in original).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 316-17. The victim-survivor may experience these intrusions in a vari-
ety of ways. Sometimes the intrusion is cognitive in nature, taking the form of recur-
rent nightmares, hallucinations, obsessive ideas, or images of the abuser. Id. at 317.
The intrusions may also be emotional in nature, causing the victim-survivor to expe-
rience feelings of helplessness and anxiety while in the presence of the offender. Id.
Finally, the intrusions may take the form of behavioral reenactments, resulting in
promiscuity, or even prostitution. Gelinas, supra note 41, at 317. In addition, if the
victim-survivor does not receive therapy, secondary elaborations tend to develop. Id.
"Typically these elaborations constitute part of the symptom picture for which pa-
tients seek treatment. The most frequent secondary elaboration is chronic depres-
sion, accompanied by guilt, poor self-esteem, and feelings of powerlessness. Learned
helplessness may be evident, and suicidal ideation and attempts are not uncommon."
Id. (emphasis in original).
44. Gelinas, supra note 41, at 317-18. The most common triggering event is a
sexual experience, and "it is not uncommon for the onset of adult sexual behavior to
trigger psychiatric symptoms." Id. The more similar the triggering event to the
abuse, the more likely the triggering event will precipitate psychiatric symptoms.
Id. In her article, Gelinas discussed a case in which a woman, six months after
marrying, was hospitalized for severe depression with suicidal ideation. During her
hospitalization, the woman began to recall being sexually abused by her father when
she was 13 years old. Gelinas concluded that "[tIhe introduction of marriage with its
obvious expectancy of adult sexual functioning precipitated a serious depression.
The negative effects of incest had lain dormant until the developmental trigger of
marriage." Id. at 318.
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Although in most cases the victim-survivor is aware of the
abuse and the wrongfulness thereof,45 many victim-survivors of
sexual abuse are unable as adults to recognize the causal link be-
tween the acts of abuse and subsequent psychological injuries.46 As
a result of repression or involuntary coping mechanisms, many vic-
tims are unable to perceive the nature of their injuries.4 7 These
same coping mechanisms may also preclude sexual abuse survivors
from causally connecting their injuries to the abuse.48 In addition,
the difficulties in perceiving the injury and in linking the injury to
the abuse are compounded by the fact that such injuries continue to
develop long after the abuse itself ends.49 Many times undergoing
therapy can assist the survivor in linking her injuries to the acts of
abuse.50
45. See Bickel, supra note 29, at 431 (stating that in most cases of sexual abuse,
the survivor was "aware of the abuse at the time it occurred and knew, by the age of
majority, that the conduct of the perpetrator was wrong").
46. See, e.g., Blackowiak v. Kemp, No. C3-94-2013, 1995 W.L. 57906 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 14, 1995) ("It is more difficult for a sexual abuse victim to understand the
causal connection between the abuse and resulting psychological injuries than it is
for the victim to know that abuse occurred."); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23,
25 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (victim alleging that due to the psychological distress caused
by the abuse, as well as the coping mechanisms which resulted, she was unable to
discover either the existence of the injuries or the causal link between the abuse and
the injuries). The Hammer court stated that even if the victim "may have harbored
some subjective doubts about the normalcy of [her father's incestuous] actions, be-
cause of [her father's] dominion and authority and her own guilt, depression and
disassociation, [the victim] had no information to a reasonable probability of the na-
ture of her injuries or the facts with respect to their cause." Id. at 26. See also,
Denise M. DeRose, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of Limitations: The
Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-Term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 191, 196
(1985) (even when the injuries become apparent, the causal connection between the
abuse and present psychological damage often remains unknown to the victim-survi-
vor); Bickel, supra note 29 (stating that while many abuse victim are aware of abuse
and wrongfulness thereof, "[g]enerally the victim suffer[s] emotional problems, but
[does] not link the problems to the experience of sexual abuse until much later in
life"). See also supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Hagen, supra note 27, at 378. These coping mechanisms can in-
clude such reactions as drug abuse, suicidal tendencies and attempts, difficulties in
personal relationships, abuse of their own children, feelings of isolation, prostitution,
sexual dysfunction, and psychological blocking mechanisms such as repression. Id.
at 378.
48. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 26, at 1278 (noting that "the pattern of abuse
becomes so well integrated into the survivors' concept of normalcy that, as adults,
they fail to connect the abuse with current psychological or emotional problems").
49. See supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text. See also Hagen, supra note
27, at 378 (stating that since the coping mechanisms which develop as a result of the
abuse "continued to operate long after the incidents of sexual molestation ended,
survivors were prevented from perceiving injuries and their connection to the acts of
abuse").
50. See, e.g., Hagen, supra note 27, at 362-63. Adults generally enter therapy
long after the abuse has ended. Thomas, supra note 26, at 1255 (stating survivors,
on the average, "entered therapy 17 years after the abuse had terminated"). "Thus,
by the time the average adult survivor causally connects the symptoms of childhood
1995]
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B. Policy Considerations Underlying the Statute of
Limitations and Exceptions Thereto
Statutes of limitations are "legislatively imposed time limits
within which civil actions must be brought."51 Once the prescribed
statutory period has run, "no legal action can be brought regardless
of the merits of the underlying claim."52 There are three common
rationales behind the existence of statutes of limitations.53 First is
the desire to prevent stale claims.54 A second rationale is to dis-
courage potential plaintiffs from sitting on their rights.55 Finally,
statutes of limitations state a period of time after which defendants
are guaranteed repose from potential lawsuits, thus allowing them
to go forward with their lives.56
Despite the strict time bars imposed by statutes of limitations,
equitable exceptions have been established and implemented by
courts and legislatures for plaintiffs unable to bring suit within the
statutory time limit.57 One such exception is the delayed discovery
rule.58 "The typical delayed discovery rule provides that the cause
of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through use of rea-
sexual abuse to her present difficulties or otherwise regains memory of the abusive
events, the [general] statute of limitations often will have barred her claim." Id.
51. Alan Rosenfield, The Statute of Limitations Barrier in Childhood Sexual
Abuse Cases: The Equitable Estoppel Remedy, 12 HAv. WoMEN's L.J. 206, 210
(1989).
52. Brian D. Gallagher, Damages, Duress, and the Discovery Rules: The Statu-
tory Right of Recovery For Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 505, 525 (1993).
53. E.g., Rosenfield, supra note 51, at 211; Melissa G. Salten, Statutes of Limita-
tions in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARv. WoMEN's L.J.
189, 206 (1984).
54. E.g., DeRose, supra note 46, at 216; Rosenfield, supra note 51, at 211. Stale
claims are disfavored due to the possibility that over an extended period of time
witnesses will die or disappear, evidence will be lost, and witnesses' memories will
fade. Thus, stale claims can inhibit defendants' ability to gather evidence to defend
against the claim. See, e.g., Salten, supra note 53, at 207. But see infra notes 65-68.
55. E.g., DeRose, supra note 46, at 217; Rosenfield, supra note 51, at 211. But
see infra notes 65-68.
56. E.g., DeRose, supra note 46, at 216; Rosenfield, supra note 51, at 211. But
see infra notes 65-68.
57. See, e.g., Carolyn B. Handler, Civil Claims of Adults Molested as Children:
Maturation of Harm and the Statute of Limitations Hurdle, 15 FoRDHAM URB. L.J.
709, 722 (1987). Such exceptions have been extended to overcome the statute of limi-
tations in the following situations: defendant's "inequitable conduct" induces the
plaintiff to refrain from bringing suit (i.e., fraud); defendant's conduct amounts to
undue influence or causes duress to plaintiff, thus rendering her unable to bring a
timely suit; plaintiff suffers from a mental disability which renders her incapable of
bringing suit within statutory time limit; plaintiff is unable to bring suit because she
has not yet discovered her injury due to its inherently undiscoverable nature (i.e.,
medical malpractice cases). Id. at 722; see also DeRose, supra note 46, at 197-216.
58. See, e.g., Hagen, supra note 27, at 365.
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sonable diligence should have discovered, both that s/he is injured
and that the injury was caused by the defendant's misconduct."59
C. Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule
Initially courts were reluctant to extend the delayed discovery
rule, or any similar type of exception, to statutes of limitations in
cases involving sexual abuse.60 In effect, this practice denied a
class of sexual abuse survivors the right to a cause of action.61
59. Salten, supra note 53, at 213. Although delayed discovery rules have been
both judicially- and statutorily-created, there generally is no difference between com-
mon law and statutory delayed discovery rules. An example of application of com-
mon law discovery rule arises in Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987). The common law delayed discovery rule, as stated by the Hammer court, is
that a cause of action "wil not accrue until the victim discovers, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the fact and cause of the injury." Id. at
25. For additional examples of the implementation of common law delayed discovery
rules, see also Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that
Illinois would extend the common law delayed discovery rule to include a case in
which a victim of incest had no conscious memory of the abuse until after statutory
minor tolling provision has expired); E.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817 (Mont. 1988) (re-
fusing to extend common law delayed discovery to a case involving sexual
molestation).
An example of the application of a statutory delayed discovery rule can be found
in K.E. v. Hoffman, 452 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the 1989
version of Minnesota Statutes § 541.073 meets constitutional muster, that its appli-
cation is appropriate in sexual abuse claim, and that it does not violate respondent's
right to due process).
60. See, e.g., Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that statute of limitations had run where the plaintiff repressed all memo-
ries of incestuous abuse until period shortly before filing suit). In Lindabury, the
court did not even discuss the possibility of the applicability of the delayed discovery
rule to sexual abuse cases. Id. at 1117. See also Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226
(Wash. 1986) (holding that delayed discovery rule did not apply when a victim of
sexual abuse brings action based solely on recollection of repressed memories and no
means exist to independently verify the allegations, in whole or in part); DeRose v.
Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987) (holding that delayed discovery rule did not ap-
ply where victim of sexual abuse was aware of the facts of the abuse at the time they
occurred, even where victim was not immediately aware of her injuries).
61. According to one source, the number of reported sexual abuse cases involving
children range anywhere from 60,000 to 100,000 in the United States per year. LEo-
NARD KARP, DoMEsTic ToRTs: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SExuAL ABUSE 154
(1989). Another estimate places the number of reported sexual abuse cases at
150,000. See Thomas, supra note 26, at 1246. It is also estimated that
"[a]pproximately 25 percent of women in the United States are sexually assaulted
before the age of 13." Evelina Giobbe, Prostitution: Buying the Right to Rape, in
RAPE AND SExUAL ASSAULT III: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed.,
1991). The number of women who have been victims of incestuous sexual abuse is
estimated at one million. Margaret J. Allen, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 609, 609 (1983). Annually, approximately 16,000 girls are
victims of incestuous sexual abuse. Id.
Despite increased media attention, increased public empathy, and an increased
response by the criminal justice system, "reported cases of childhood sexual abuse
continue to escalate." See Thomas, supra note 26, at 1247-48; Hagen, supra note 27,
at 357-58. Childhood sexual abuse tends to be underreported because sexual ex-
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Gradually, legislatures 62 and courts63 began allowing sexual abuse
survivors to utilize delayed discovery rules. Many courts have de-
termined that the rationales which justify strict application of limi-
tations statutes simply do not extend to sexual abuse cases.6 4 In
addition, despite the application of the delayed discovery rule in
sexual abuse cases, the defendant is still afforded adequate protec-
tion through other means.65 While the defendant may have diffi-
culty exonerating himself with stale evidence, the plaintiff will also
have a difficult time assembling such evidence so that she can effec-
tively carry her burden of proof in a stale claim.66 The defendant is
also protected by modem rules of evidence, including the exclusion-
ary and hearsay rules which prevent evidence that is unreliable or
unduly prejudicial from reaching the jury.67 Furthermore, the
delayed discovery rule is not an elimination of the statute of limita-
tions. Rather, the delayed discovery rule simply postpones the be-
ginning of the limitations period until such time as the plaintiff
reasonably discovers the facts and cause of her injury.66
Many jurisdictions have extended the delayed discovery rule
to those sexual abuse cases in which the plaintiff repressed the ac-
ploitation of children depends on "concealment, emotional blackmail, threats, and an
imbalance of power for their sustenance." Thomas, supra note 26, at 1249. A child
often will not reveal the abuse due to fear that her report will not be believed, her
emotional and financial dependency on the abuser, ignorance that the abuser's be-
havior is a crime, or embarrassment. Id.
62. For an example of a delayed discovery statute drafted specifically to govern
sexual abuse claims, see supra note 20.
63. For examples of various judicial applications of delayed discovery rule, see
infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609 (1990). In speaking of
the applicability of the delayed discovery rule to sexual abuse cases, the Evans court
said that "[tihe limitations period is intended to run against those who are neglectful
of their rights and who fail to use reasonable and proper diligence in the enforcement
thereof. It is not the policy of the law to unjustly deprive one of his[sicl remedy." Id.
See also Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). The Hammer
court, in applying the delayed discovery rule to extend the statute of limitations in
an incestuous abuse case, reasoned that '[tihe policy justification for applying the
statute of limitations to protect defendants from the 'threat of liability for deeds in
the past' is unpersuasive in incestuous abuse cases." Id. at 27. Furthermore, the
Hammer court said that the injustice of barring a meritorious suit before the plain-
tiff is aware of the injury "outweighs the threat of stale or fraudulent actions." Id.
65. See Hagen, supra note 27, at 375-76.
66. Id. at 375. In fact, as noted by Hagen, the abuser actually has the advantage
over the victim-survivor in terms of gathering evidence due to the fact that the
abuser has always been aware of the harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 376. In contrast,
"[uinder the principles of the [delayed] discovery rule, the plaintiff has newly discov-
ered the injury or its cause." Id.
67. Id. at 375.
68. Id. at 375-76.
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tual fact of the abuse.69 Other jurisdictions have adopted a modi-
fied version of the delayed discovery rule under which the
limitations period for sexual abuse cases does not begin to run until
such time as the plaintiff discovers both the act of abuse and the
wrongfulness thereof.70 Finally, some states, including Minne-
sota,71 through legislative enactment have applied the delayed dis-
covery rule to toll the limitations period until such time as the
victim-survivor knows of the abuse and has causally linked her in-
juries to such abuse.72
69. See, e.g., Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1994). The Ault court held that
the discovery rule applies "to toll the statute of limitations where a victim of child-
hood sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse until a later time." Id. at 873.
The Ault court further stated that the statute of limitations "begins to run when the
victim recalls or otherwise discovers that he or she was sexually abused or when,
through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the victim should have discovered the
sexual abuse." Id. at 873.
70. See e.g., Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990) (holding that civil
action based on parent's sexual abuse of plaintiff as a child does not accrue until
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered acts of molestation and wrongfulness
thereof). The Evans court did not go so far as to conclude that the delayed discovery
rule applied in cases in which plaintiffs were unable to link their injuries to the
abuse.
71. See supra note 20. Prior to the enactment of the Minnesota delayed discov-
ery statute, claims based on personal injury caused by sexual abuse were governed
by the general statute of limitations under Minnesota Statutes section 541.07(1).
See MINN. STAT. § 541.07(1) (1988); K.E. v. Hoffman, 452 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990). It was in 1989 that the Minnesota legislature enacted the delayed dis-
covery rule, under which a claim based on personal injury caused by sexual abuse
"does not arise until the victim knew or had reason to know [that the] injury was
caused by abuse. See KE, 452 N.W.2d at 511; see also MiN. STAT. § 541.073 (Supp.
1989). The 1989 amendment served to "trigger the statute of limitations on the vic-
tim's discovery of the cause of the injury rather than the misconduct itself." H.D. v.
White, 483 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). Finally, in 1991, the Minnesota
legislature amended § 541.073, the effect of which "changed the statute of limita-
tions for an intentional tort based on sexual abuse from two to six years." Id. at 501.
72. The following are examples of the application of the Minnesota delayed dis-
covery rule: Blackowiak v. Kemp, No. C3-94-2013, 1995 W.L. 57906 (Minn. Ct. App.
Feb. 14, 1995) (finding the limitations period tolled because evidence did not conclu-
sively establish that victim-survivor should have known that sexual abuse caused
his injuries); ABC v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 513 N.W.2d 482 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding the statute not tolled because plaintiff should have known that the abuse
had caused her injuries); H.D. v. White, 483 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(concluding that the "effect of the 1989 amendment was to trigger the statute of
limitations on the victim's discovery of the cause of the injury rather than the mis-
conduct itself').
Other jurisdictions have also adopted the same delayed discovery rule: See e.g.,
Sinclair v. Brill, 857 F. Supp. 132 (D.N.H. 1994) (stating that a cause of action does
not accrue until such time as plaintiff discovers, or, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered the injury and its causal connection to the acts of
abuse); see also Hertel v. Sullivan, 633 N.E.2d 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding the
statute had run). In Hertel, the court stated that the statute of limitations begins to
run when a person "knows or reasonably should know of his [sic] injury and also
knows or reasonably should know that it was wrongfully caused." Id. at 40 (empha-
sis added). See also Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (re-
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A victim-survivor has much to gain if given the opportunity to
bring a civil suit against her assailant.73 One benefit is that the
victim-survivor may receive compensation from the assailant for
her injuries.7 4 A civil suit also allows the victim-survivior the op-
portunity to face her assailant in court.7 5 In addition, should the
victim-survivor prevail, the assailant is publicly blamed for the
abuse and his conduct is socially condemned.76
Once a court has established that the delayed discovery rule is
applicable to a sexual abuse case, the next step in the analysis is to
ascertain the time at which the cause of action should have accrued.
This determination is generally reserved for the finder of fact.77
The fact finder must decide when the victim-survivor connected the
sexual abuse to her injuries, thus triggering the limitations period
according to the delayed discovery rule. Therefore, under the
delayed discovery rule, it is improper for a trial court to dismiss a
sexual abuse case based on the delayed discovery rule unless the
record establishes conclusively that the victim-survivor had reason
to know of the causal connection between her injuries and the
abuse.7 8
manding for determination of when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered
her injuries and their cause).
73. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 61, at 617.
74. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 61, at 617.
75. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 61, at 617 (noting that facing the assailant, while
it can be extremely difficult for the victim-survivor, can be very empowering for her
as well).
76. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 61, at 617.
77. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("The
point at which the statute of limitations commences under the discovery rule is a
question of fact."); Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 864 P.2d 776, 778 (Mont. 1993) (stating that
whether plaintiff knew or should have known that alleged abuse was the cause of
her injuries is a question of fact to be decided by a jury); Blackowiak v. Kemp, No.
C3-94-2013, 1995 W.L. 57906, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1995) ("When a plaintiff
first knew or had reason to know that sexual abuse caused his [sic] injuries ordina-
rily involves a factual determination that must be resolved by a trial on the merits.");
Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 93-1846, 1994 W.L. 449315 (Wis. Ct. App.
Aug. 23, 1994) (addressing question of whether plaintiff knew or should have known
that her injuries were caused by the abuse is a question of fact inappropriate for
determination on a motion to dismiss); see also K.E. v. Hoffman, 452 N.W.2d 509,
514 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
78. As long as a plaintiff claiming an inability to perceive the connection between
her injuries and the abuse "offers to prove that a psychological disability prevented
knowledge of the causal relationship, a court should not summarily reject an at-
tempt to do so through the guise of a statute of limitation prohibition." Hagen, supra
note 27, at 379.
Courts rejecting a claim by a plaintiff who asserts that, although she had always
known of the abuse, she was unable to make a connection between the injuries and
the abuse, are "in essence imputing knowledge of the causal relationship between
the plaintiff's current adult injuries and prior childhood sexual abuse." Id. at 378.
See also Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907, 909 (N.D. 1989) (stating that "con-
cern about the availability of objective evidence should not preclude application of
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I. The Roe v. Archdiocese Case
In Roe, 79 the court examined the applicability of the delayed
discovery rule.S0 The Roe court noted that in ABC,81 a previous
case addressing the applicability of the delayed discovery rule to a
sexual abuse case,8 2 the court had applied an objective standard to
determine whether a reasonable person placed in the victim's situa-
tion should have known that she was a victim of sexual abuse.83
Using this standard, the Roe court concluded that there existed no
issue of material fact as to whether Roe had reason to know, prior
to April 1985,84 that her injuries were caused by the abuse.8 5
the [delayed] discovery rule."); Blackowiak v. Kemp, No. C3-94-2013, 1995 W.L.
57906 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1995) ("When reviewing a summary judgment based
solely on the running of time under section 541.073, this court assumes that the
accused committed sexual abuse, unless the district court has ruled otherwise.").
79. Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 518 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
81. ABC v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 513 N.W.2d 482 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
82. Id. The facts of ABC are as follows: the appellant ABC alleged that she and
Father Kolar engaged in sexual intercourse before appellant's eighteenth birthday.
Id. at 483-84. Prior to this, ABC had been engaged in a counseling relationship with
Father Kolar. Id. at 483. ABC then discovered she was pregnant with Father Ko-
lar's child, a fact which she hid. Id. at 484. ABC suffered a miscarriage. ABC, 513
N.W. 2d at 484. Approximately one year later, Father Kolar told ABC that he had
decided to continue in his ministry with the church and terminate his relationship
with her. Id. Following the miscarriage and the breakup with Father Kolar, ABC
began attending counseling sessions. Id. ABC met XYZ that same year. Id. Two
years later they were married by Father Kolar. Id. Approximately six years later,
ABC "learned that Father Kolar had been accused of taking advantage of other vul-
nerable young women." Id. ABC sought further counseling due to the psychological
problems she began suffering after learning of Father Kolar's other exploits. Id. at
485. Subsequently, ABC brought an action against Father Kolar. ABC, 513 N.W. 2d
at 485.
83. Id. at 486.
84. Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 518 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
According to the court's findings, Roe knew of the abuse prior to moving to Arizona.
Id. at 630-31. Therefore, Roe knew of the link between the abuse and her injuries
prior to the time during which Roe repressed memory of the abuse. This determina-
tion is important because even if Roe repressed memories of the abuse after moving
to Arizona in April 1985, the statute of limitations would continue to run during the
repression because Roe had previously linked her injury to the abuse. Had the court
found that Roe had not linked her injury to the abuse prior to her move to Arizona,
the statute of limitations would not have begun to run until Roe moved back to Min-
nesota, whereupon the memories of the abuse resurfaced. The court's finding that
Roe should have linked her injuries to the abuse prior to 1985 indicates that, accord-
ing to the court, the suit should have been brought within six years of 1985, i.e., by
1991. Roe initiated this suit in July of 1992.
85. In so holding, the Roe court relied in part on the similarities between the
facts in Roe and those in ABC v. Archdiocese of St. Paul. Roe v. Archdiocese of St.
Paul, 518 N.W.2d 629,632 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); see ABC v. Archdiocese of St. Paul,
513 N.W.2d 482 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). TheABC court found that evidence indicated
that ABC should have known that her injuries were caused by the sexual abuse.
Such evidence included, inter alia, the following- ABC knew that priests were to
remain celibate; ABC frequently cried after sexual relations with the defendant be-
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Appellant Roe contended that ABC86 was inapplicable be-
cause, unlike Roe, the victim-survivor in ABC did not suffer from
repressed memory of the abuse.87 The Roe court disagreed, stating
that ABC88 was applicable to Roe's situation because the plain lan-
guage of the delayed discovery statute does not allow for suspension
of the statute of limitations once it begins to run.8 9 The court deter-
mined that Roe had, or should have, causally connected her injuries
to the sexual abuse prior to her move to Arizona. Therefore, the
statute of limitations was triggered and would not thereafter be
suspended, even though Roe subsequently suppressed memories of
the abuse.90
Roe also argued that the court disregarded legislative intent
by considering evidence that Roe was aware of the sexual abuse
during the course of the relationship. 91 The Roe court again re-
cause she was struggling with the situation; ABC discussed the relationship with
others, including another clergy member and a person whom she was dating; ABC
admitted to feelings of sadness; ABC lost faith in her religion, and suffered depres-
sion and anxiety as a result of the relationship. Roe, 518 N.W. 2d at 631-32.
The Roe court held that the facts in Roe were sufficiently similar to ABC to
support a finding that Roe should have known that her injuries were caused by the
abuse. Id. at 632. Roe admitted that she felt uncomfortable about her sexual rela-
tionship with Piche, supported, according to the court, by the following facts: Roe
knew that Piche was to remain celibate; Roe sent a letter to Piche which stated that
their relationship was a "dead-end street"; Roe expressed her concern over the rela-
tionship to Piche several times in confession; Roe disclosed the nature of the rela-
tionship to a close friend; Roe and her friend directly confronted Piche about the
relationship, and Roe interpreted Piche's response as an admission by Piche that the
relationship was wrong; Roe disclosed the relationship to another clergy member.
Id. at 630. Additionally, the Roe court found that both Roe's attempted suicide and
the fact that Roe moved to Arizona to get away from Piche further demonstrated
that Roe knew or should have known that her injuries were caused by the sexual
abuse. Id. at 632.
86. ABC, 513 N.W.2d 482.
87. Roe, 518 N.W.2d at 632.
88. ABC, 513 N.W.2d 482.
89. Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 518 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
The Roe court held that the plain meaning of Minnesota Statute section 541.073
merely "delays the beginning of the limitations period until a person 'knew or had
reason to know that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse.'" Id. Thus, the Roe
court concluded that the statutory language does not support a rule which would
allow the limitations period to toll when an adult victim, after connecting her inju-
ries to the abuse, subsequently represses memories of the abuse. Id. The Roe court
further held that had the legislature intended to draft such a tolling statute, it could
have done so. Id.
90. Id.
91. Roe, 518 N.W.2d at 632. The limitations period should not begin to run until
the last abusive incident has occurred. See MIN. STAT. § 541.073 subd. 2(b) (West
1992) ("The plaintiff need not establish which act in a continuous series of sexual
abuse acts by the defendant caused the injury."). Therefore, the limitations period
should not begin to run until the abuse has ended. See also id. at 633 (Amundson, J.,
concurring) (stating "if the victim was aware of the fact of the abuse and its wrong-
fulness after the last abusive incident, then the statute of limitations begins to run").
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jected Roe's argument, stating that the court need not make find-
ings regarding legislative intent because evidence indicated that
Roe knew of her injury after the relationship ended in late 1984.92
Thus, the Roe court determined that there existed no genuine issue
of material fact as to whether Roe should have known, no later than
April 1985, that her injuries had been caused by the sexual abuse.
The Roe court granted summary judgment in favor of respondent
priest, ruling that Roe's sexual abuse claim was barred by the stat-
ute of limitations.93
HI. The Delayed Discovery Rule and the Potential to
Provide a Remedy: A Missed Opportunity?
The purpose of the delayed discovery rule, as interpreted by
the Minnesota Court of Appeals, is to provide victim-survivors of
childhood sexual abuse a civil remedy,94 thus allowing these vic-
tims an equal right to seek compensation for injuries. 95 The
delayed discovery rule "plainly reflects awareness of the difficulty
sexual abuse victims have in identifying and recognizing their inju-
ries immediately."96 The Roe court's findings may effectively
amount to a contravention of these purposes.
A Dangers of Not Allowing the Limitations Period to Toll
When Victim Subsequently Represses Memories of
the Abuse
By holding that the delayed discovery statute does not provide
for the subsequent suspension of the statute of limitations once it
begins to run,97 the Roe court has created a statutory interpreta-
92. Roe, 518 N.W.2d at 632. The Roe court said that the evidence showing that
Roe attempted suicide and moved to Arizona to get away from Piche after the rela-
tionship ended, demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether Roe should have known that her injuries had been caused by the sexual
abuse. Id.
93. Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 518 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
94. See, e.g., K.E. v. Hoffman, 452 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
95. See id. The KE. court held that since sexual abuse victims are more likely to
repress memories of abuse, these differences reasonably justify the legislature's deci-
sion to entitle sexual abuse victims a specific statute of limitations. Id. The court
further stated that sexual abuse victims benefit from the delayed discovery rule be-
cause memories of the abuse may be repressed, which could result in their claims
being barred under the general statute of limitations. Id.
96. Id. at 513-14. The legislative purpose of the delayed discovery rule is to limit
the possibility that sexual abuse claims will be barred under the general statute of
limitations, thus holding the assailant liable for his conduct. KE., 452 N.W.2d at
514. This purpose stems from an acknowledgment by the legislature that sexual
abuse survivors may repress memory of the abuse or have difficulty discovering the
actual source of their problems for many years. Id. See also supra notes 29-50.
97. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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tion with potentially devastating results for victim-survivors of sex-
ual abuse. In the concurring opinion, Judge Amundson recognized
and addressed one such potential danger of the delayed discovery
statute as interpreted and applied by the majority.9 8 Judge
Amundson expressed concern that in many sexual abuse cases, the
delayed discovery rule will be difficult to apply, or simply will not
apply at all.99 Judge Amundson offered an illustration of a situa-
tion in which a victim-survivor of sexual abuse may be precluded
from relying on the delayed discovery statute in bringing a suit
against her abuser.' 0 0 Judge Amundson described a hypothetical
situation in which a child is abused by a parent from age sixteen to
age twenty. As a result of the abuse, the victim experiences feelings
of guilt and helplessness. Thereafter, the victim represses all mem-
ory of the abuse until age twenty-eight. Judge Amundson then con-
cluded that because the victim was aware of both the abuse and its
wrongfulness, O the statute of limitations would begin to run when
the victim was twenty years old, the time at which the abuse ended.
Since the delayed discovery statute, as currently interpreted under
Roe, does not allow for suspension of the statute of limitations once
it begins to run, the victim would be barred from bringing a claim
once she subsequently recalled the abuse.102 The victim-survivor
in such a situation would have a choice between two unreasonable
alternatives: either bringing the action immediately following the
abuse; or bringing the action during the time she repressed the
memory. 103
The result of the Roe court's holding is that the statute of limi-
tations will begin to run at the time the victim-survivor initially
links her injuries to the sexual abuse, even if the victim-survivor
thereafter represses the memories. The limitations period will not
begin to run, however, until the victim-survivor reaches age eight-
een.' 0 4 Therefore, under the Roe court's rule, once the victim-survi-
98. Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 518 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
(Amundson, J., concurring).
99. Id. Judge Amundson attributed this difficulty to the plain language of the
delayed discovery statute, rather than to the court's interpretation of the statute.
See id.
100. Id.
101. Note, however, that feelings such as guilt and helplessness only support a
finding that Roe knew Piche's conduct was wrong, not that Roe was aware that her
injuries were caused by Piche's conduct. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
102. Roe, 518 N.W.2d at 633 (Amundson, J., concurring).
103. Id.
104. MIN. STAT. § 541.15(aX1) (1988) states:
(a) ... any of the following grounds of disability existing at the time
when a cause of action accrued or arising anytime during the period of
limitation, shall suspend the running of the period of limitation until
the same is removed; provided that such period, except in the case of
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vor has linked the abuse to the injury, the limitations period will
begin to run the moment the victim-survivor turns eighteen.
The Roe court attempted to limit the holding to adult survi-
vors who subsequently repress memories of abuse.10 5 Under this
interpretation, if a child linked her injuries to the abuse as evi-
denced by feelings of guilt, shame, and depression,106 and thereaf-
ter repressed all memory of the abuse before reaching the age of
eighteen, the limitations period would not trigger automatically at
the time the victim-survivor reached the age of eighteen, unless the
victim-survivor upon reaching eighteen recalled the abuse and
linked the injury to the abuse again. However, a distinction be-
tween adults and children is not supported by the plain meaning of
the delayed discovery statute. 107 In fact, the plain language of the
Minnesota delayed discovery statute makes no distinction between
children and adults.1OS Therefore, the hypothetical set forth in the
concurring opinion could very well hold true.
The Roe court has withdrawn the benefit of the delayed dis-
covery rule from the sexual abuse survivor who was able to link her
injuries to the abuse either during or a short time after the abuse
occurred and who then repressed the memory of the abuse. This
interpretation of the Minnesota Court of Appeals is inconsistent
with the purpose of the delayed discovery rule.109 The plain lan-
guage of the statute does not set forth a requirement that the vic-
tim-survivor repress memory of the abuse within a specific time
period after the abuse occurred in order to receive the benefit of the
delayed discovery rule. As stated by appellant Roe, it only makes
sense that the repression would occur after the abuse ended.11o
In summary, the goal in interpreting the delayed discovery
statute should be to advance the purpose of the delayed discovery
infancy, shall not be extended for more than five years, nor in any case
for more than one year after the disability ceases: (1) that the plaintiff
is within the age of 18 years ....
MINN. STAT. § 541.15(aXl) (1988).
105. Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 518 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
("The statute does not provide that the limitations period is tolled if an adult victim
subsequently suppresses memories of sexual abuse.") (emphasis added).
106. For a discussion concerning the court's determination that feelings of shame,
guilt, or depression warrant a finding that a victim-survivor knew that her injuries
were caused by the sexual abuse, see infra note 137 and accompanying text.
107. For text of the Minnesota delayed discovery rule, see supra note 20 and ac-
companying text.
108. See supra note 20.
109. See supra notes 94-96. "If a statute is ambiguous, we determine the probable
legislative intent and give the statute a construction consistent with that intent."
Tuma v. Commissioner of Economic Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn. 1986).




rule, which is to provide a remedy to victims of sexual abuse, who
often have difficulty in "identifying and recognizing their inju-
ries."lii Allowing for suspension of the limitations period during
the victim-survivor's repression of the abuse, even though at one
time she may have linked her injuries to the abuse, furthers the
goals of the delayed discovery statute. In contrast, the Roe court's
interpretation could have devastating repercussions for adult vic-
tim-survivors of childhood sexual abuse which were not intended by
the legislature. The legislative purpose of the delayed discovery
statute is to provide a remedy to sexual abuse survivors. The Roe
court's interpretation controverts this purpose.
B. The Overlooked Prong of the Delayed Discovery Test
Even if the statute does not allow for the tolling of the statute
of limitations upon subsequent repression of the memories of abuse,
the Roe court did not apply the correct standard for determining
whether Roe's claim had accrued. The Minnesota delayed discovery
rule provides that the victim-survivor of sexual abuse must bring
an action within six years of the time the plaintiff knew or had rea-
son to know that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse.11 2 The
effect of the delayed discovery rule is to "trigger the statute of limi-
tations on the victim's discovery of the cause of injury rather than
the misconduct itself."11S Thus, even if a survivor was aware of the
abuse while it was occurring, did not subsequently repress memory
of the abuse, and was aware that the abuse was wrong, under the
plain meaning of the Minnesota delayed discovery rule, the action
does not accrue until the survivor causally connects the abusive
acts to her current injuries.114
The victim's discovery of the cause of her injuries is distin-
guishable from the victim's knowledge of the wrongfulness of the
defendant's conduct.115 In most cases of sexual abuse, the survivor
both becomes aware of the abuse during the time the abuse is occur-
111. KE. v. Hoffman, 452 N.W.2d 509, 513-14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). See also
supra notes 94-96.
112. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
113. H.D. v. White, 483 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
114. See supra notes 20-21; see also supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
The standards used, while having some similarities, are distinguishable. Compare
Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870 (1994) (stating the statute of limitations begins to run
when the victim-survivor discovers or reasonably should have discovered, the sexual
abuse) and Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990) (stating the claim does not
accrue until plaintiff discovers or should discover acts of molestation and wrongful-
ness thereof) with MJNN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 subd. 2(a) (West 1992) (stating the
claim does not accrue until plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was
caused by the sexual abuse).
115. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
270 [Vol. 13:253
THE DELAYED DISCOVERY RULE
ring and realizes the wrongfulness of the perpetrator's act by the
age of majority, yet remains unable to link the abuse to the psycho-
logical injuries suffered.' 16 At the time of the abuse or shortly
thereafter, a sexual abuse victim often feels that the defendant's
acts are wrong.ll 7 However, because a victim feels her assailant's
acts are wrong does not logically require that the victim also be
aware that her injuries are caused by the defendant's wrongful
acts."18 Many of the injuries experienced as a result of sexual
abuse, such as depression, suicidal tendencies, alcohol and drug
abuse,"l 9 do not become manifest until years after the initial
abuse.12 0 Therefore, the victim's realization of the wrongfulness of
the defendant's acts can develop long before many of her injuries
even begin to surface.121 Moreover, another symptom of sexual
abuse is the inability to recognize the causal link between the inju-
ries and the abuse.' 22 This inability to recognize the nexus be-
tween the abuse and the injury can result from repression,' 2 3
116. See Bickel, supra note 29, at 431. See also supra notes 45-50 and accompa-
nying text.
117. See supra note 45-50. That the survivor had knowledge that the defendant's
conduct was wrong can also be imputed from the victim's feelings of guilt, depres-
sion, and shame. See supra note 28-29 and accompanying text.
118. See Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). In Ham-
mer, the court noted that even if the plaintiff, a sexual abuse survivor, had "harbored
some subjective doubts about the normalcy of [her father's incestuous] actions," she
had no information with respect to the cause of her injuries. Id. at 26. Thus, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals distinguishes between an awareness of the wrongfulness
of the assailant's conduct and a knowledge of the causal connection between injuries
and abuse. See also supra notes 45-50; Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1110
(1988) ("Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the
plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by the wrongdoing");
Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990) (stating that knowledge by the survi-
vor of the act of abuse and injury is insufficient in itself to start the limitations pe-
riod under the delayed discovery rule).
119. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). In Ham-
mer, Laura brought a claim at the age of 21, alleging that she had been sexually
abused by her father from the time she was five years old until she was 15-years old.
During the abuse, Laura developed "various coping mechanisms and symptoms of
psychological distress, including great shame, embarrassment, guilt, self-blame, de-
nial, depression, and dissociation from her experiences." Id. at 24. These feelings of
shame, guilt, etc., evidence that Laura was aware that her father's conduct was
wrong. In addition, when Laura was 15, she reported her father's sexual abuse to
her mother. Id. This provides further evidence that Laura knew her father's con-
duct was wrong. These psychological coping mechanisms "continued to operate on
her long after the incidents of sexual molestation had ended.... ." Id. at 25. Thus,
Laura was aware of her father's wrongful conduct before all of her injuries had
surfaced.
122. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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denial,124 or other coping mechanisms,125 which the survivor devel-
oped as a result of the abuse. Due to these coping mechanisms,
which were involuntarily triggered as a result of the abuse, a victim
may know that the defendant's conduct is wrong, yet be unable to
make a connection betweeen the abuse and her injuries.126 All of
this supports the conclusion that there is a distinction between the
plaintiff's knowledge of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct
and the recognition by the victim that the abuse caused the injuries
suffered.
Discovery of the nexus between the abuse and the resultant
injuries triggers the beginning of the limitations period under the
Minnesota delayed discovery statute. 127 The plain meaning of the
statutory language of the delayed discovery rule clearly supports
the conclusion that the Minnesota legislature chose to adopt the
causal connection standard. The statute specifically states that an
action must be commenced "within six years of the time the plaintiff
knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by the
abuse."128 The statutory language makes no mention of knowledge
by the victim of the "wrongfulness" of the defendant's conduct. Ear-
lier judicial interpretations of the delayed discovery statute recog-
nized that the Minnesota legislature chose to embrace the causal
connection standard. The Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that
"[ulnder the new law, known as the delayed discovery rule, the stat-
ute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff knew or had reason
to know that the injury was caused by sexual abuse, rather than
when the abuse actually occurred."129 Thus, it is evident that in
enacting the delayed discovery statute, the Minnesota legislature
intended to adopt the causal connection standard rather than the
"wrongfulness" standard.
124. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
126. See Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W. 2d 23, 24 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); see supra
note 121 (describing the facts of the case). In Hammer, the survivor, Laura, had
experienced psychological feelings of distress such as guilt, shame, embarrassment,
depression, and self-blame during the time the abuse was occurring, indicating that
Laura knew that her father's conduct was wrong. Id. at 24. The court found that
despite Laura's feelings, due to the psychological distress and the resultant coping
mechanisms, she was unable to preceive her injuries and their conneciton to her
fahter's abusive acts. Id. at 25. The Hammer court concluded tha tLaura had "no
information to a reasonable probability of the nature of her injuries or the facts with
respect to their cause." Id. at 26. See also supra notes 45-50.
127. MIN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 subd. 2(a) (West 1992).
128. Id.
129. H.D. v. White, 483 N.W.2d 501,502 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). The court in KE.
v. Hoffmann stated that the statute "plainly reflects an awareness of the difficulty
sexual abuse victims have in identifying and recognizing their injuries immediately."
K.E. v. Hoffman, 452 N.W.2d 509, 513-14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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Despite the distinction between knowledge of the wrongful-
ness of the assailant's conduct and knowledge of the causal nexus
between the abuse and the resultant injuries, the Roe court applied
the discovery rule in a way that triggered the statute of limitations
upon the plaintiff's knowledge that the defendant's conduct was
wrongful, rather than upon plaintiff's discovery of the causal con-
nection. 130 The Roe court determined that Roe knew or should
have known that her injuries were caused by Father Piche's con-
duct due to the following facts: Roe admitted to feeling uncomforta-
ble about her relationship with Father Piche; Roe knew that priests
were to remain celibate; Roe attempted to commit suicide; and Roe
moved to Arizona in order to distance herself from Father Piche.131
However, these findings tend only to support a subjective knowl-
edge by Roe that Father Piche's conduct was wrongful. 132 In Ham-
mer v. Hammer,133 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' finding that the
victim-survivor experienced psychological feelings of distress such
as shame, guilt, depression, and self-blame during the period in
which she was being abused indicated only that the survivor knew
that the defendant's conduct was wrong.' 34 That the victim-survi-
vor experienced such feelings did not, according to the Hammer
court, warrant a finding that the victim-survivor had perceived the
causal connection between the abuse and her injuries.135 In fact,
such psychological symptoms of distress may actually prevent a
reasonable victim-survivor from perceiving the causal connec-
tion.136 The Roe court's findings that Roe frequently cried after
sexual relations with Father Piche, that she felt sadness, lost faith
in her religion, suffered from depression and anxiety, felt used and
abused by Piche, and attempted to commit suicide tend to add sup-
port to Roe's contention that she suffered injuries as a result of Fa-
ther Piche's conduct. 137 Sexual abuse survivors often experience
feelings of guilt, depression, anxiety, low-self esteem, and
130. Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 518 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
(Amundson, J., concurring). Judge Amundson, in the concurring opinion, expressly
states that "if the victim was aware of the fact of the abuse and its wrongfulness
after the last abusive incident, then the statute of limitations begins to run." Id. at
633 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 632. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 28-29, 43, 115-126 and accompanying text.
133. 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
134. Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 24 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). See supra
text accompanying notes 122-126.
135. See supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
137. Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 518 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
See supra notes 28-33, 43 and accompanying text.
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shame.138 However, such feelings are recognized symptoms of sex-
ual abuse and do not indicate a knowledge of the nexus between the
injury and the abuse.139
Given the factual findings made by the Roe court, there exists
an issue of material fact as to whether Roe knew or should have
known of the causal connection between the abuse and the resul-
tant injuries.140 Even if the facts established that Roe was aware of
the sexual relationship and aware that the relationship was wrong,
she was still entitled to the benefit of the delayed discovery rule. 141
The evidence did not support the court's ruling that, as a matter of
law, Roe knew of the causal link between Father Piche's conduct
and her injuries.142
138. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
140. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 93-1846, 1994 W.L.
449315, *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1994). In Pritzlaff, a case very similar to Roe v.
Archdiocese, the plaintiff alleged that Father Donovan used his "position as a priest
to force and coerce [her] to have a sexual relationship with him without her consent."
Id. at *1. The relationship between Pritzlaff and Donovan continued for six years,
ending in 1965. Id. Pritzlaff initiated the claim against Donovan 27 years later, in
1992, claiming that due to her coping mechanisms, which developed as a result of
the abuse, she was unable to perceive the cause of her psychological injuries until
1992. Id. at *1-3. The Pritzlaff court held that "[tihe factual impasse between [the
victim's] knowledge of the events and her professed inability to relate them to her
injuries presents a factual issue inappropriate for determination on a motion to dis-
miss."). Id. at *3. See also supra notes 77-78. Compare Blackowiak v. Kemp, No.
C3-94-2013, 1995 W.L. 57906 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that evidence did not
establish that victim-survivor knew or had reason to know that the sexual abuse
caused his injuries) with Roe v. Archdiocese, 518 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
In Blackowiak, the victim-survivor filed his complaint in 1992, seeking recovery
for injuries resulting from sexual abuse that occured in 1970 by Kemp, Blackowiak's
former junior-high counselor. In holding that Blackowiak's claim was not barred by
the statute of limitations, the court attempted to distinguish Roe. First, the court
stated that Blackowiak suffered "less tangible injuries of alcoholism, lack of self-
worth, and an inability to maintain relationships." Blackowiak, 1995 W.L. 57906 at
*5. These injuries, according to the Blackowiak court, are less easily traced than are
those injuries suffered by Roe. Id. The court listed as Roe's injuries attempted sui-
cide and self-mutilation. Id. While it may appear that a suicide attempt is more
easily traceable than are other symptoms of sexual abuse, attempted suicide merely
"constitutes part of the symptom picture for which patients seek treatment." Ge-
linas, supra note 41, at 317. This indicates that even though a victim-survivor has
reacted to the abuse in an extreme manner, such as attempted suicide, absent ther-
apy, it is still very common for her to experience difficulties in linking her reaction to
the abuse. See supra notes 43-44, 47. It was only after Roe began counseling that
she was able to causally connect her injuries to the abuse. See supra notes 16-18.
The Blackowiak court went on to state that Roe experienced her injuries during the
abusive relationship, whereas Blackowiak's problems developed gradually after his
association with Kemp had ended. Blackowiak, 1995 W.L. 57906 at *5. This state-
ment is simply not true. Although Roe experienced some problems immediately af-
ter the relationship with Piche ended, many of Roe's most serious injuries, such as
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C. The "Reasonable Person in the Victim-Survivor's
Situation" Standard
As a result of sexual abuse, the victim-survivor may involun-
tarily develop coping mechanisms which render her unable to per-
ceive the connection between the sexual abuse and psychological
injuries.' 43 The pattern of sexual abuse becomes so well ingrained
within the victim-survivor's concept of normalcy that it becomes dif-
ficult for the victim-survivor to see the causal nexus between her
injury and the abuse.144 These coping mechanisms continue to op-
erate long after the abuse has ended.i45 Therefore, by its very na-
ture, sexual abuse renders its victim-survivors unable to perceive
the nexus between abuse and injuries. The inability to make this
connection is in itself an injury caused by sexual abuse.' 46 A court,
in determining the reasonableness of the period of time that it took
for the victim-survivor to discover the connection between her inju-
ries and the abuse must recognize that the inability to make such a
connection is, in fact, a reasonable reaction to the sexual abuse. 147
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Mil-
waukee, 148 seemed to recognize this. In Pritzlaff, the court held
that "the factual impasse between [the victim-survivor's] knowledge
of the events and her professed inability to relate them to her inju-
ries represents a factual issue inappropriate for determination on a
motion to dismiss." 149
The Roe court held that a reasonable person in Roe's situation
would have known that the injuries were caused by the sexual
abuse.150 In applying the reasonable person standard, the Roe
court did not consider the effects of sexual abuse on a victim-survi-
vor's ability to link the abuse to her injuries.l 5 ' In finding that Roe
did not act with due diligence in discovering her cause of action, the
Roe court first noted that since Roe experienced symptoms such as
suicidal ideation and self-mutilation, developed years after the relationship had
ended. See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
144. See Thomas, supra note 26, at 1278. "It is unreasonable to expect at any
predetermined point in time that the adult survivor could readily target the parent
or authority figure as the source of such problems or instantaneously recall the abu-
sive events." Id. at 1287.
145. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 26, at 1286.
147. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 26, at 1287.
148. No. 93-1846, 1994 W.L. 449315 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). The facts of Pritzlaff
are set forth supra note 142.
149. Id. at *3.
150. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 25-50 and accompanying text.
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feelings of guilt, shame, depression, and suicidal tendencies,152 Roe
should have known that her injuries were caused by the abuse.153
The Roe court acknowledged that Roe may have subsequently re-
pressed her memories of the abuse, but held that Roe should have
discovered her cause of action before the repression even oc-
curred,154 and that the statute of limitations was not thereafter
tolled during the period in which she repressed her memories of the
abuse. 155 However, the Roe court failed to consider whether Roe's
inability to link the abuse to her injuries before she repressed her
memories may have been a result of coping mechanisms, other than
repression, which victim-survivors often develop as a direct result
of sexual abuse.156 Such coping mechanisms include, for example,
deniall57 and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,158 as well as suicidal
ideations.159 Considering only the effects of repression on the abil-
ity of Roe to causally connect her injuries to the abuse was error.
Had the court considered coping mechanisms other than repression,
the court may have found that summary judgment based on the
statute of limitations was improper.
In addition, the Roe court did not consider the fact that many
of Roe's injuries developed long after her relationship with Father
Piche had ended,160 and long after the time the court held that Roe
should have connected her injuries to the abuse.161 In fact, the re-
152. Roe v. Archdiosese, 518 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
153. Id. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
154. Roe, 518 N.W.2d at 632. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. If a victim-survivor develops
denial as a coping mechanism in dealing with sexual abuse, the result can be that
the victim denies the connection between the abuse and her injuries. Despite this
denial, if the victim-survivor does not receive treatment, symptoms can begin to
manifest. See supra note 43. The victim-survivor can begin to develop "secondary
elaborations," which become part of the symptom picture for which victim-survivors
most often seek treatment. Id. Such symptoms include feelings of guilt, depression,
poor self-esteem, and suicidal ideations and attempts. Id. Note that these symp-
toms are virtually identical to those experienced by Roe.
158. See supra note 34. If a victim-survivor develops Post Traumatic Stress Dis-
order as a result of sexual abuse, she may avoid any stimuli, including thoughts and
feelings, associated with the abuse, which may result in an inability to make a con-
nection between the abuse and her injuries.
159. See Thomas, supra note 26, at 1278. See also Gelinas, supra note 41, at 317
(stating that suicidal ideations and suicide attempts are not uncommon).
160. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. In fact, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals stated that Roe "experienced [her] injuries during the abusive relationship."
Roe v. Archdiocese, 518 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added). Com-
pare Blackowiak v. Kemp, No. C3-94-2013, 1995 W.L. 57906, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App.
Feb. 14, 1995) (finding that the victim did not experience her injuries during the
abusive relationship).
161. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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pression itself should be included as an injury caused by the
abuse.162 It was the development of these subsequent injuries
which compelled Roe to seek counseling.163 It was only upon the
triggering event164 and subsequent counseling sessions that Roe
was able to make the connection between the abuse and her inju-
ries.165 One of the purposes of the delayed discovery rule is to allow
the victim-survivor reasonable time to discover that she was in-
jured.166 By failing to consider Roe's contention that many of her
injuries developed immediately prior to the filing of her claim, the
Roe court is controverting this purpose. The courts should not pun-
ish a victim-survivor for lack of diligence "when her inability to ini-
tiate the legal action is a direct result of childhood sexual abuse."167
Sexual abuse cases should not be dismissed under the guise of
the delayed discovery rule simply because the court foresees eviden-
tiary problems with the victim-survivor's case. 168 The focus in de-
termining whether to apply the delayed discovery rule to a sexual
abuse case should be whether notions of fundamental fairness war-
rant the application of the delayed discovery rule in the case at
hand.169 In making such a determination, a court should balance
the "harm to a defendant of being sued on a stale claim with harm
to a plaintiff of being denied a remedy."'170 Decisions based on the
merits or issues of credibility are issues to be determined by a trier
of facts, not an appellate court.171
Because Roe was over the age of majority when the alleged
sexual abuse occurred, 172 the court may have harbored doubts
whether the relationship between Roe and Father Piche constituted
sexual abuse. However, the question of whether Father Piche's con-
duct fell under the statutory definition of sexual abuse' 73 is a ques-
tion requiring a decision regarding the credibility of the parties and
as such is suitable for a decision on the merits, with any issues of
162. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 29, 38, and
accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 37, 44
and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
167. See Rosenfield, supra note 51, at 212.
168. See Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 231-32 (Wash. 1986) (Pearson, J.,
dissenting).
169. Id. at 231.
170. Id. at 235.
171. Id. at 231.
172. See supra text accompanying note 3.
173. See supra note 25.
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credibility submitted to the trier of facts.174 Such substantive is-
sues of fact are distinguishable from the question of whether the
statute of limitations has tolled. By dismissing Roe's claims based
on a statute of limitations defense, the Roe court has set a danger-
ous precedent for future victim-survivors of sexual abuse.
Conclusion
The numerous injuries caused by sexual abuse are severe and
devastating, both to the victims and to society. In addition to cop-
ing with these injuries, sexual abuse survivors are confronted with
a number of barriers when attempting to bring a suit against their
abusers, including repression, denial, an inability to link the abuse
to the injuries, and the development of injuries years after the
abuse has ended and the statute of limitations has run. The special
difficulties sexual abuse victim-survivors encounter in attempting
to bring an action justify applying a delayed discovery statute of
limitations in sexual abuse cases. The Minnesota delayed discovery
rule tolls the statute of limitations until such time as the victim-
survivor discovers or reasonably should have discovered the causal
connection between the sexual abuse and the resultant injuries suf-
fered. The task is then left to the courts to ensure that the purpose
of the delayed discovery statute is effectuated and that victim-sur-
vivors of sexual abuse have access to the courts to initiate civil suits
against their assailants. The Roe court found that the limitations
period will not be suspended in circumstances in which a victim-
survivor links her injuries to the sexual abuse and thereafter re-
presses memories of the abuse. The repercussions of the Roe court's
rule are potentially devastating for victim-survivors of sexual
abuse, and could effectively deny a class of plaintiffs the right to a
cause of action for injuries caused by sexual abuse. Moreover, by
examining whether Roe knew or should have known of the wrong-
fulness of the assailant's actions rather than examining whether
Roe knew or should have known that her injuries were caused by
the abuse, the Roe court misapplied the standard set forth by the
Minnesota legislature in the delayed discovery statute. Further-
more, the reasonable person standard as applied by the Roe court
did not incorporate the documented effects that coping mecha-
nisms, other than repression, have on a victim-survivor's ability to
causally connect her injuries to the abuse. The Roe court has suc-
ceeded in creating additional obstacles which the future plaintiff-
174. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13:253
1995] THE DELAYED DISCOVERY RULE 279
survivor must overcome in order to successfully bring a claim
against her abuser.
In determining whether the statute of limitations has run in
cases based on injuries caused by sexual abuse, the court should
focus on whether notions of fundamental justice warrant the appli-
cation of the delayed discovery rule. Sexual abuse claims should
not be dismissed under the guise of the delayed discovery rule sim-
ply because the court foresees evidentiary problems with the vic-
tim-survivor's case. Questions concerning issues of credibility or
the merits are to be decided by the fact finder. The precedent set by
the Roe court could prove to be an insurmountable barrier to fair
judicial consideration of sexual abuse claims on the merits.

